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1Abstract
The adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists, like the recent “parity law”
in France, can be fully rationalized on the basis of the self interest of male
incumbent politicians. This paper explains why the parity law was approved
in its form and, at the same time, why it has not been very eﬀective. The
existence of a voters’ bias in favor of male candidates is suﬃcient to convince the
incumbents to advocate for equal gender representation in party lists, because
it raises the incumbents’ chances of being reelected. The existence of male bias
in the French electorate is empirically conﬁrmed in this paper. We also show
that parity law may have assembly composition eﬀects and policy eﬀects that
vary with the electoral system.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 2001 the French Parliament passed a law — the so called “parity law” — that
forces parties to choose roughly equal numbers of men and women as candidates
in their lists. What can motivate this type of gender quotas in party lists? Can
the choice of a parity law be consistent with the self interest of the incumbent
(men) politicians who passed the law? Why were deputies almost unanimously in
favor of the reform while the senators were mostly opposed? Why did the reform
take the form it took? Why was it so little eﬀective at the national level? This
paper aims to provide a consistent set of answers to all these questions, by means
of a simple formal model of constitutional reform incentives as well as an empirical
analysis of the main assumptions and conclusions of the model. We view this also as
an important ﬁrst step towards understanding more generally the conditions under
which the self interest of a majority can suﬃce to explain the introduction of laws
that prima facie protect or foster minority interests.
We shall provide a number of insights on the role of electoral systems in terms
of the ex-ante incentives to pass the law as well as in terms of the ex-post diﬀer-
ences in gender representation eﬀects and policy eﬀects. The ex-ante reasoning of
incumbent legislators that we uncover can also be extended to a broader set of con-
texts, and could help to explain the emergence of many types of aﬃrmative action
laws. The ex-post eﬀects that we discuss clarify some important externalities be-
tween electoral reforms and gender representation reforms, and in particular suggest
that the advocates of a more equal gender representation in politics face a trade-oﬀ
when evaluating an electoral system: the more eﬀective parity is likely to be with
an electoral system, the more unlikely it is that a parity law is approved (given that
electoral system) or that such an electoral system is approved given a parity law.
Let us begin by relating the main facts that make the French experience a really
rich “natural laboratory.” For each of the most important elective bodies — namely
the Assembly, the Senate, and the Municipalities — there is a radically diﬀerent
electoral system, and the parity law has determined drastically diﬀerent eﬀects in
those three types of elections.1 The two chambers, the Assembly of deputies and
1The Assembly is formed using single-member-district majority rule. The Senate is elected using
plurality rule in small districts and proportional representation in large ones. Finally, municipal
3the Senate, are called by the Constitution to vote together on constitutional reforms
like the one discussed here. Since the Assembly is the larger chamber, the almost
unanimous support of the reform in the Assembly is the main fact to explain, being
almost necessary and suﬃcient to explain the approval of the reform. The parity
reform takes diﬀerent forms in the diﬀerent types of elections, and in the case of
the Assembly it means that each party should have between 48% and 52% of can-
didates of each gender across districts. The other two types of elections use “closed
party lists” (except the senatorial elections in small districts where it is a two-round
plurality rule but where parity does not apply), and the parity reform requires the
parties to alternate men and women in the lists. A peculiar feature of the French
Parity Law, as approved in 2001, is that if a party does not satisfy the law it must
pay some fees per violation (or suﬀer proportional reductions in government fund-
ing). The main right wing party (UMP) presented in 2002 only 19.93% of women
and paid EUR 4M, representing 15.8% of its government funding, while the main
left wing party (a coalition led by the Socialist Party) presented 36.13% of women
and lost 9.1% of its funding (see Jourdain [8]).2
The common explanation of the approval of the parity law, in newspapers and
among parity observers, is that parity law was passed because parties realized that
“the French people wanted it.” On the other hand, the common explanation for
the possibility to violate the law by paying fees relates to the pressure of male
incumbents within the parties to remain candidates in favorable districts. In other
words, the common view is that the electorate demanded some kind of parity reform,
but the male conspiracy within the party hierarchies made the reform ineﬀective.3
Here we propose a completely diﬀerent explanation. In contrast with the state-
ment that “the French people wanted parity,” we postulate that, ceteris paribus,
voters prefer male candidates; given the presence of such a male bias in the vot-
ers’ population, which we shall empirically verify, it is rational for male incumbent
elections employ a two-round proportional representation system with a ﬁfty percent majority bonus
for the plurality winner of the second round.
2Note that in France campaign ﬁnancing is very restricted, so that these reductions in party
funds have non trivial consequences.
3This is the view developed, for instance, by the oﬃcial “Observatoire de la parité entre les
femmes et les hommes” in their report to the Prime Minister following the elections (see Zimmerman
[13]).
4deputies to pass a parity law: In fact, a parity law weakens the pool of challengers,
since it becomes likely for an incumbent to face a woman challenger in the next
election and women are perceived to have, on average, a weaker electoral support.
As far as the rationalization of per violation fees is concerned, we will show
that parity law with the possibility to violate it by paying fees can dominate ex-
ante, under some reasonable conditions, both the status quo and the “pure” parity
without that ﬂexibility. The argument goes as follows: Given the voters’ bias in
favor of men candidates, parties are in favor of a gender quota because it increases
the probability for incumbents (conditional on running) to run against a woman and
be reelected. On the other hand, pure parity (with no violations allowed) decreases
the probability for the male incumbents of a large party to run again. Therefore,
fees are rationalizable as they constitute a direct way to make more incumbents
run than the strict application of parity would allow. The ex-ante drawback of
parity with fees is that if one party pays fees, this decreases the chances for the
candidates of the other party to run against a woman. Therefore it is not always
true that parity with fees ex-ante dominates both strict parity and no-parity. One
suﬃcient condition for this to be true is if there exists a (realistic) preference by
party leaders for incumbents over new candidates. Given this party preference for
reelecting incumbents over electing new candidates, if fees are suﬃciently large,
parties are willing to pay them only in order to allow incumbents to run. Parity
with fees, then, has the two attractive properties (for the incumbents) that (1) it
increases the probability for incumbents to run against women, and (2) it does not
prevent incumbents from large parties to run.
The intuition for the opposition of the senators is more straightforward than
the above intuition for the support given to the reform by the deputies, and it is a
direct consequence of the electoral formula. To see this, assume for simplicity (and
almost realistically) that all the incumbent senators are men. Senatorial elections
are conducted using Closed List Proportional Representation (CPR henceforth),
and parity law requires each party to alternate men and women in the candidate
list. Given that voters can only choose among parties and the k seats assigned
to a party go to the top k candidates in the party list, parity law determines an
automatic substitution of incumbents with female candidates.4 In summary, single
4In contrast, in an Open List system like the Belgian one, the assignment of seats within a party
5member district (henceforth SMD) majority rule, given the presence of some degree
of male bias, allows the incumbent deputies to gain from the parity law; whereas
t h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ef o rt h es e n a t o r sg i v e nC P R .
In terms of ex-post eﬀects, the ﬁrst question concerns the gender representation
outcome: The 2002 Assembly elections resulted in only a moderate increase in the
percentage of women elected, from 10.9% to 12.3%, and the result was not much
better than this in the 2001 and 2004 Senate elections. The reason for the low
eﬀectiveness in Assembly elections is related once again to the presence of male bias
among voters. Given the evidence provided in this paper about such a male bias
in the French voters’ population, passing parity law only helped strengthen ex-post
the incumbency advantage of the already elected deputies. This, in conjunction
with the extensive recourse to paying fees, explains the low eﬀectiveness. On the
other hand, the low eﬀectiveness in Senate elections is due to “party proliferation”
strategies: incumbent senators managed to keep their seats by becoming leaders of
new lists.
As a side ex-post phenomenon, it is also interesting to note that parity law can
aﬀect the party composition of the Assembly. In particular, parity law should be
expected to favor the party with the largest number of incumbents when policy
preferences alone would make it lose many seats. The intuition for this result is
simply that, as parity helps incumbents, some of them are reelected in spite of a
sharp decrease in the voters’ preference towards the platform they defend. Under
CPR the party composition eﬀects may be more diﬃcult to predict, because of
integer problems related to the D’Hondt formula and because of the heterogeneity
of incumbency advantage across list members.
Given that the theoretical results of the paper rest on the crucial assumption that
in the electorate there is a net bias in favor of men, we will validate this assumption
empirically. We show that a male bias did exist in France in the relevant period.
That is, controlling for observables, when a new (or incumbent) male candidate
runs against a woman, he does better than male and female new (or incumbent)
candidates running against an opponent of the same sex. Similarly, females running
against males do worst than females running against females. We will also show
depends on the relative number of votes received by the candidates, and with this system PR would
not automatically imply a one-to-one mapping between parity in the list and parity in the outcome.
6that this male bias is not the result of new male candidates running in districts
more favorable to their party than new female candidates. In other words, the
empirical analysis conﬁrms that the most relevant form of bias is among voters, and
is not an artifect of a strategic male conspiracy among party leaders. The gender of
the new candidates is not correlated to the party’s performance in their district at
the last election.
There are many reasons for considering the French case as much more than
just a case study. First of all, it constitutes a unique natural laboratory, given the
three very diﬀerent electoral systems for the three main elective bodies. The low
eﬀectiveness of parity law for the two national elective bodies contrasts with the
municipal level, where women obtained 47.5% of the seats. With a two-round PR
system neither could male bias play a role nor was it possible to make use of the
same party proliferation strategies used in the Senate elections. More generally, our
analysis hints which electoral reforms could make parity more eﬀective. Consistent
with the observation that French deputies were in favor of the law whereas senators
opposed it, an electoral reform that makes a parity law more likely to be eﬀective is,
on the other hand, likely to generate opposition by the incumbents. In other words,
the message here is that if such an electoral reform is made in a country before
parity laws are discussed, such an electoral reform may make it impossible to pass
the parity law. As more countries will start debating reforms like the parity law,
the empirical links between electoral systems and gender representation laws will
become more transparent in the future. At the theoretical level, the externalities
across diﬀerent dimensions of a constitutional reforms are deﬁnitely an understudied
and important problem, of which we are providing a clear example.
The French experience analyzed in this paper may also be considered important
in terms of comparative politics. As we will report below in a brief comparative
section, most scholars now agree that the small number of women in politics in the
United States derives from a “supply” problem, and not from a “demand” problem,
since no evidence can be found of male bias in the American voters’ population,
and little in party behavior. We will not extend the comparisons to other countries,
leaving a full-blown comparative study for future research, but the comparison be-
tween France and the US is at least suggestive of a likely positive correlation between
“demand” biases and aﬃrmative action laws.
7The paper is organized as follows. We will focus mostly on the theoretical and
empirical analysis of SMD assembly elections. We will then highlight the relevant
features of the senatorial races and we will elaborate on the electoral design issues
mentioned above. We will conclude with some comparative remarks and some hints
about the potentially important link between demand biases and aﬃrmative action
laws in general.
2 Single Member District Elections
In this section we focus on the Assembly elections, for which the electoral system
is two-ballot majority rule. For the sake of simplicity, in our model we assume that
there are only two parties, so that the system is equivalent to one-ballot plurality.
Downs [5] deﬁnes a political party as “a coalition of men seeking to control
the governing apparatus by legal means,” where by coalition he means “a group
of individuals who have certain ends in common and cooperate with each other
to achieve them.” A simple way to operationalize this deﬁnition in a theoretical
framework is to view a party as a “coalition of incumbents seeking reelection.” Given
the importance of incumbent politicians in any party hierarchy, it is clear that any
party leader will have at least two objectives in mind when choosing the composition
of the party candidate list: the maximization of the number of seats the party will
obtain and the maximization of the chances of reelection of the party’s incumbent
politicians. The assumption that parties care about the number of seats obtained
by their policy platform as well as about the probability of reelecting incumbents
will be kept throughout.
The crucial assumption of the theoretical model is that if a man candidate runs
against a woman he is elected no matter what the voters of that district think of
the candidates’ policy platforms. This very strong form of male bias is assumed in
order to make computations manageable, but the qualitative results do not change
if a weaker form of male bias is considered. The existence of a signiﬁcant degree of
male bias in the French electorate is veriﬁed in the second part of this section.
Before turning to the more general model, it is important to illustrate the basic
intuition. Suppose that we just needed to explain why men incumbents can prefer a
“pure” parity law to the status quo without parity. We could give the explanation
8by means of a simple example: Suppose that the country is divided in two districts,
so that the assembly is composed by two incumbents, i.e., the previously elected
deputies of those two districts; suppose also that the two incumbents are of the
two major parties and that they must run in the district where they were elected
(either because it would be illegal or because voters would punish such a switch).
If no parity law is passed, the chances of reelection of an incumbent depend on the
realization of voters’ policy preferences in his district, whereas if a pure parity law
is passed, each incumbent is sure to run against a woman (as the men quota will
be used by the other incumbent running in his own district), and hence there is an
additional advantage, inducing a higher probability of reelection (probability 1 in
the case of the extreme gender bias mentioned above). However, explaining why
they passed a law that allows parties to pay fees to violate parity is not possible by
means of a simple example, and requires a more explicit analysis of all the politicians’
incentives.
2.1 Male bias and parity law: the model
There are two parties, L and S. There is a set [0,1] of districts. The current assembly
is composed of the candidates which were elected in the previous elections and are
still in oﬃce. Districts in [0,λ) have an incumbent of party L, whereas districts
in [λ,1] have an incumbent of party S. We assume without loss of generality that
λ ≥ 0.5 (party L is the large party).
At time 0, members of the assembly vote for a value of c ∈ [0,∞], the fee a party
needs to pay to circumvent parity in a district. If c =0 , there is no limit to the
number of men running in the country for the same party, that is, there is no parity
requirement (the status quo). If c = ∞, it is illegal to have more than ﬁfty percent
of men running, the pure parity case. If 0 <c<∞, there is some parity requirement
but the law allows parties to send more than ﬁfty percent of men, provided they
pay c for each additional male candidate. We need to prove that the vote outcome
can be a positive and ﬁnite c.
At time 1, lists are composed. That is, each party decides, for each district,
whether a man or a woman runs for election. Incumbents are assumed to re-run in
their district if their party decides to run a man in that district. Also, we assume that
9incumbents cannot shift from their home districts to another one. Consequently, if
a man runs in a district where the party did not win the previous election, than this
man is a new candidate.5
At time 2, voting takes place. In each districts, voters vote for the candidate
they prefer. There are only two candidates in each districts, so that no strategic
voting takes place.
As mentioned in the introduction, voters diﬀer in their platform preferences,
which can change over time, but they also have very strong gender preferences:
Being in favor of the platform of one party translates in a vote for that party unless
that party’s selected candidate is a woman running against a man. In the time
elapsing between time 0 and time 2, voters’ platform preferences may change. At
time 2, districts [0,z) prefer the platform of party L,a n d[z,1] are in favor of the
platform of S. The implicit assumption here is that in any possible new realization
of voters’ platform preferences it cannot happen that district i has a majority of S
platform supporters and a district i0 >ihas a majority of L supporters. This order
assumption allows us to simplify the treatment of uncertainty at time 0, since in
this way the uncertainty is just about the parameter z. The uncertainty about z is
greater at time 0 than at time 1. For simplicity, we assume that it is known at time
1, whereas only the probability distribution is known at time 0.6
The utility of an incumbent of party p, p ∈ {L,S}, depends on the number of
seats obtained by his party in the time 2 election, Np; on whether or not he is
reelected; and on the budget of the party, which is aﬀected by the total cost paid
by the party to circumvent parity, denoted by Cp. Formally, for all i ∈ [0,λ)




where a is the utility of being reelected, Ii is the indicator taking value 1 if i is
reelected and 0 otherwise, and U(N) denotes the utility that i derives from the fact
5The implicit assumption is that incumbency is local, and does not constitutes an advantage if
one switches district. The little evidence of incumbents running in diﬀerent districts from the one
where they had been elected conﬁrms that this assumption is realistic, but the qualitative results of
our model hold even when we allow incumbents to do this kind of shift, but with useless additional
computation complexity.
6No result depends on the simplifying assumption that z is completely certain at time 1.E v e r y -
thing would go through in a similar manner if at time 1 there were a less precise update.
10that his party obtains N seats. Even though the result could be proved with any
U(N) weakly convex for all N ∈ [0,0.5) a n dw e a k l yc o n c a v ef o ra l lN ∈ (0.5,1],t h e
following functional form is the simplest to consider:
U(N)= Ns if N<0.5
0.5 if N =0 .5
1+Ns if N>0.5.
For all i ∈ [λ,1]




Consistent with the Downsian view of a party discussed at the beginning of this
section, we deﬁne a party as the aggregation of its incumbents. Consequently, we
assume that the utility of a party is the sum of the utilities of its incumbents:
UL = λU(NL)+aIL − CL, (3)
and
US =( 1− λ)U(NS)+aIS − CS (4)
where Ip stands for the number of reelected incumbents of party p, p ∈ {L,S}.
Parity means that there needs to be ﬁfty percent of candidates of each gender
for each party. Any deviation from that gender distribution entails a marginal cost
of c, so that
Cp = c|Mp − 0.5|,p ∈ {L,S}
where Mp is the fraction of men candidates of party p selected at time 1.
Given all the assumptions above, we prove the following result:
Proposition 1: If s is small and a is large (i.e., reelecting an incumbent
is important for a party but the marginal utility of a new seat is small unless it
allows the party to obtain the majority), then there exist well behaved probability
distributions of voters’ platform preferences such that, at the constitutional choice
stage (at time 0), a “parity with fees” system is unanimously preferred to the no
parity system, and is preferred by a majority to the pure parity system.
In a nutshell, we have shown that male bias allows the incumbents to obtain
a new type of incumbency advantage by passing an aﬃrmative action law with a
11progressive cover. The formal proof is in appendix 1. The intuition is similar to the
one given for the two-district case as far as the reason for preferring pure parity to the
status quo. The intuition for the additional result that parity with fees can dominate
even pure parity is as follows: given that a party is a coalition of incumbents and
hence reelecting incumbents has priority over electing new candidates, the larger
party wants a parity law in order to protect its incumbents in the states of the
world in which platform preferences happen to favor party S, but given that L’s
incumbents are more than ﬁfty percent, pure parity is dominated by a system where
even the other λ − 0.5 incumbents can be protected (with some probability) by
paying fees. A small s and a relatively large a are needed so that there exist values
of c for which parties are ready to pay the fee only if it allows an incumbent to
run: indeed, if no such value of c exists, parity with fees cannot be optimal as
either the party would refuse to pay to allow one more incumbent to run, or, if the
party pays, the opponent party also pays and the incumbent runs against a man,
thereby loosing his seat anyway. There are restrictions on the class of admissible
distribution functions because the uncertainty to be reelected needs to be suﬃciently
large: if a large fraction of incumbents are sure to be reelected, they may have no
incentive to pass the law as it doesn’t increase the probability that their party win
the election and it is likely to impose a cut in the budget of the party. However, as
one can verify in the appendix, the conditions on a, s a n do nt h es k e w n e s so ft h e
probability distribution to obtain consensus on parity with fees are very reasonable.
There are a number of remarks and/or corollaries to the main result stated in
proposition 1:
1. Combining the eﬀects of the 1995 and 1997 elections, the UMP party had the
largest number of incumbent politicians at the time of the parity reform. As
one can verify from appendix 1, the larger party is the one that is expected to
pay more fees, consistent with the fact that the UMP party indeed violated
the law signiﬁcantly more than PS.
2. As a corollary of proposition 1, one could easily check from its formal proof that
the expected number of women elected given parity law (with fees allowed) is
zero. The result is thus very sharp: not only the parity law as it passed in
France is perfectly consistent with the self interest of the male incumbents, as
12proved by proposition 1, but it is also completely ineﬀective in terms of the
oﬃcial goals.7
3. Parity may aﬀect the party composition of the Assembly (and hence policies)
when voters’ platform preferences change with respect to the status quo. The
number of seats won by the large party that is losing support in terms of
platform preferences is (weakly) larger than if parity was not applied. Thus,
the introduction of parity reduces the variance of party composition.
Finally, note that in the informal literature the parties are directly blamed for the
low eﬀectiveness of the law (male conspiracy within parties). In our model parties
are coalitions of strategic incumbents, so they strategically choose their preferred
institutional system at time 0, and they play strategically at the list composition
stage. A district where a party is almost sure to win is also one where it has an
incumbent, and hence, for the values of the parameter we look at, it is rational for
the party to have the incumbent running there. However, there is no room in the
model for male conspiracy, which would bias the party list composition decisions in
favor of men just because of their gender. Only self interest matters. Among other
things, the next subsection will establish that indeed from the French elections data
there is very little to no evidence of male conspiracy within parties, whereas the
evidence of existence of a male bias among voters will be very clear. Let us turn to
the empirical analysis.
2.2 Existence of male bias among voters
In this section, we will show empirically that in the 2002 French National Assembly
election a male bias existed among voters. We deﬁne as male bias the additional
percentage of votes a male candidate gets, ceteris paribus, when he runs against a
woman. We remark that by male bias we do not refer necessarily to discriminating
preferences, but to whatever reasons that make voters have a net preference for men
when all the other observable variables are kept constant.8
7Of course, with a less extreme type of gender bias, the model could determine a positive (but
small) number of expected women elected, especially when there is a signiﬁcant change in the
platform preferences of the electorate with respect to the status quo.
8For example, a male bias can arise from a wide-spread belief that men are more corrupt, or
bring more pork to the district, whereas women are more concerned about global public goods, and
13Beside exhibiting some male bias as deﬁned above, we need to show that this
does not derive from party bias. As a party bias would result in a strategic allocation
of men in favorable districts, we show below that the data does not exhibit such
a party bias. In other words, parties have not preferred men to women in “good”
districts.9
Our data is constructed based on the information collected from the website of
French National Assembly.10 The website provides, among other things, biograph-
ical information on 2002 candidates, their party aﬃliation and incumbency status,
and the district-by-district ﬁrst- and second-round results in both 1997 and 2002
elections, together with abstention rate of each district. We have complemented
this with data on candidate campaign expenditures and party contributions to each
candidate’s campaign from Publication Simpliﬁée des Comptes de Campagnes.11 In
order to avoid diﬃculties associated with variable number of parties and the result-
ing strategic voting behavior, we focus on those districts where election went to the
second-round and where the two second-round candidates were from the two main
party coalitions of 2002 elections, PS and UMP.
For observation/candidate j,w ea s s u m eal i n e a rm o d e lo ft h ef o r myj = βXj+εj.
Diﬀerent speciﬁcations will be estimated, but in the basic one yj is candidate j’s
score in the second round of the 2002 elections. Beside a variable measuring the
male advantage, which we describe next, the vector Xj of controls includes the score
in the second-round of the 1997 election by the candidate of the same district and
same party as candidate j.12 This party-district-speciﬁc variable counts for the
aggregate preference toward a speciﬁc party within each district. A second control
is age diﬀerence between opponents in the same district, since a candidate’s age is
p l a u s i b l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t hh i s ( h e r )p e r c e i v ed quality or experience. We also control
for the diﬀerence of the square of their age.13 Finally, we control for party aﬃliations,
the electorate of a district may prefer a focus on the former type of policies.
9Clearly, overall men may be in better districts, but only because most incumbents are men.
10http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections
11Or, Simpliﬁed Publication of Campaign Accounts, which is published in the Oﬃcial Journal of
the French Rebublic in the Administrative Documents series.
12Thus we also eliminate some observations that have no such correspondence in 1997. (Since
the UMP did not exit in 1997 we use the score from the RPR or UDF.) For example, if no PS,
RPR or UDF candidates ran in that district in 1997 or if they were eliminated in the ﬁrst round.
13Both are divided by 100 to make results easier to present.
14since they could be correlated to the gender bias. This is done by including an
indicator variable that takes value 1 if the candidate is from UMP and 0 if he or she
is from PS. A constant term is also included, which represents the average score a
candidate won in 2002 when all other regressors were zero.14 Error terms (εj)f o l l o w
standard assumptions imposed by ordinary least squares estimation method.15
The key regressor is the male advantage, which measures the male bias. The
model assumes that when a male candidate has a female opponent, he does better
than when the opponent is male (holding everything else constant). The male ad-
vantage can be measured by a variable that takes value 1 if a male has a female
opponent, 0 if the two candidates are of the same gender, and -1 if a female has
a male opponent. We will also show, although it is not crucial to our argument,
that the implicit symmetry assumption — namely that woman vs woman is just like
man vs man and that the advantage of a man incumbent (respectively, new man
candidate) over a woman is equivalent to the disadvantage of a woman incumbent
(respectively, new woman candidate) with respect to a man — is actually supported
by the data.
Table 1 reports estimation results. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) only use new can-
didates while speciﬁcations (3) and (4) use incumbents.16 Speciﬁcations (1) and
14We also considered controlling for the diﬀerence in expenditures between the candidates in the
same district and the square of the diﬀerence. Out of the eight speciﬁcations reported in Tables 1 and
2, these variables were statistically signiﬁcant in only two cases. The biggest coeﬃcient estimate (in
absolute value) has its ﬁrst non-zero digit in the ﬁfth position past the decimal. More importantly,
adding these regressors had no qualitative impact on the other estimates. The only diﬀerence
worth noting is that three coeﬃcient estimates lose statistical signiﬁcance, “Age Diﬀerence” in
speciﬁcations 1 and 2, and the “Diﬀerence of Square of Age” in 1. For these reasons these regressors
were excluded from the results reported here but are available from the authors on request.
15The fact that the dependent variable lies between 0 and 1 could be problematic in an OLS
regression if we had regressors with values in a large range. Here it is not a problem because
the right hand side is composed mostly of regressors between 0 and 1. Nonetheless, we have





= βXj + εj. The conclusions are
unchanged (in particular the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of our measure of male bias), thus we
prefer to report the more familiar and easier to interpret case where the dependent variable is not
transformed.
16In speciﬁcations (1) and (2), since we limit attention to new candidates, and since in each second
round of each district election the race is 90% of the time between an incumbent and a new candi-
date, only 10% of the new candidates need to be dropped in order to avoid having two candidates
15(3) control for the type of the opponent (either a new candidate, a 1997 loser, or a
1997 winner that was moved district): for (1) the excluded category is an incumbent
opponent and for (3) it is a new candidate opponent. These dummies are jointly
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value < 0.1)i ns p e c i ﬁcation (1) but not in speciﬁcation
(3) (p-value > 0.1) and thus we also report (2) and (4) where those dummies are ex-
cluded. For new candidates, these estimates suggest that it is better to run against
any type of candidates than against an incumbent, but that eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant only against 1997 losers. Own party score in 1997 and the party position
are statistically signiﬁcant in every speciﬁcation. Not surprisingly, the eﬀect of own
party score in 1997 is positive.17 Age diﬀerence has a positive impact on score for
both new candidates and incumbents, but is statistically signiﬁcant only for new
candidates.
The “key result” is the statistically signiﬁcant male bias, which is observed for
both new candidates and incumbents irrespective of the speciﬁcation. In appendix
2w es h o wi nT a b l e3h o wt h i se ﬀect diﬀers when a woman faces a woman, a woman
faces a men, and a men faces a woman, from the baseline where a man faces a man.
We show that the hypothesis that woman vs woman is no diﬀerent from man vs man
and that the advantage of a man vs a woman equals the disadvantage of a woman
against a man cannot be rejected (this is termed the symmetry hypothesis in the
table).
Another way to see if there exists a male bias is to look for the impact of gender
on the probability of winning. Table 2 presents logit estimates of the determinants
of a win (win equals one and loose equals zero) using the same regressors as for
the speciﬁcations presented in Table 1. In both speciﬁcations (5) and (7) the joint
hypothesis that the eﬀect of the type of opponent (new, 1997 loser, or was moved
district) is equal to zero cannot be rejected (p-value > 0.1). For both new candidates
from the same district (which would determine correlation between the error terms). However, the
results are basically identical with or without such a restriction of the sample. When more than
one new candidate ran in the same district, the selection rule was to select male candidates if they
ran against a woman, otherwise to select the loser.
17One eﬀect of the male bias could be to aﬀect party allegiance as a function of the gender of
the candidates which would suggest to interact own party score in 1997 with gender. In all the
regressions reported in the paper, doing so didn’t aﬀect overall results and the eﬀect of own party
score in 1997 interacted with gender was never statistically signiﬁcant.
16Candidates: New Incumbent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Party Score in 1997 0.545*** 0.610*** 0.504*** 0.512***
(0.054) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043)
Male Advantage 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Age Diﬀerence /100 0.421** 0.464** 0.064 0.107
(0.179) (0.181) (0.164) (0.162)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.005** -0.005** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Party Right of Center 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.083***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Opponent is a New Candidate 0.015
(0.010)
Opponent is a 1997 Loser 0.034*** -0.008
(0.012) (0.005)
Opponent was Moved 0.002 -0.027
(0.013) (0.029)
Constant 0.172*** 0.150*** 0.235*** 0.227***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 248 248 290 290
Standard errors in parentheses
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 1: The Eﬀect of Male Bias on Scores
17and incumbents, all other regressors have the expected sign and are statistically sig-
niﬁcant. For a male, having an opponent of opposite gender increases the probability
of winning — and for a woman it decreases it. The popularity of a candidate’s party
in 1997 has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. The older the candidate with respect to
(her)his opponent, the more likely (s)he is to win, but this eﬀect is decreasing as the
age diﬀerence increases. Finally, everything else being equal, the UMP candidates
were more likely to win in 2002.
One potential criticism is that experience in politics is historically correlated
with being male. At the same age, males are likely to have more experience in
politics than female candidates do. To address this, we interact the diﬀerence in
age and the diﬀerence in the square of age with the male advantage variable.18
Those estimates for speciﬁcations similar to those reported in Table 1 can be found
in the Appendix (Table 4). For none of the speciﬁcations (1c-4c) are either the
age diﬀerence interacted with the male advantage or the square of the diﬀerence
interacted with the male advantage statistically signiﬁcant, nor are they jointly
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value > 0.1).
This is not simply a result of the particular structure of the male advantage
variable: if instead we interact the age diﬀerence and its square with one indicator
variable for male candidate with female opponents, and separately interact it with
an indicator for female candidate with male opponents, the results are the same:
none of the interactions are individual l yn o rj o i n t l ys t a t i s t i c a l l ys i g n i ﬁcant.
Furthermore, one would expect this to be less of an issue for incumbents: female
incumbents should be expected to have similar oﬃce holding experience as men, and
we have shown the male advantage to be important for incumbents as well.
At h i r df a c tc o n ﬁrming that the male advantage is not simply an artifact of
unobserved experience diﬀerences is the following: If we estimate speciﬁcations 1
and 2 on a subsample of young candidates (more speciﬁcally, using the subsample of
candidates who are younger than the youngest incumbent in our sample), Estimates
of the male advantage are still statistically signiﬁcant (and the coeﬃcient estimate
is actually larger at about 0.024 in both speciﬁcations), in spite of the fact that
in that subsample the oﬃce holding experience does not exist for any gender. In
18If at a given age men tend to have more (relevant) experience, and this matters to voters, then
the interaction variable should be statistically signiﬁcant.
18Candidate: New Incumbent
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Own Party Score in 1997 15.955*** 18.265*** 24.373*** 24.486***
(3.641) (3.448) (4.112) (4.069)
Male Advantage 1.007*** 0.992*** 0.810** 0.893***
(0.336) (0.306) (0.323) (0.316)
Age Diﬀerence /100 25.635* 24.902* 27.072* 30.707**
(14.087) (13.737) (15.083) (14.951)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.265* -0.258* -0.285** -0.317**
(0.138) (0.135) (0.145) (0.144)
Party Right of Center 3.779*** 3.493*** 5.389*** 5.287***
(0.698) (0.581) (0.892) (0.885)
Opponent is a New Candidate -0.145
(0.688)
Opponent is a 1997 Loser 1.516* -0.600
(0.879) (0.373)
Opponent was Moved -0.747 -0.245
(0.882) (1.486)
Constant -10.905*** -11.636*** -13.074*** -13.359***
(1.922) (1.845) (2.240) (2.218)
Observations 248 248 290 290
Standard errors in parentheses
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 2: The Eﬀect of Male Bias on Winning (Logit)
19other words, the male advantage exists among young new candidates and incumbent
candidates, and in both cases there should be a relatively homogeneous experience
across genders. This being said, our story is in no way tied to this observation.
Even if the male bias was the product of perceived experience diﬀerences, our model
would still apply, since it relies on the existence of a male advantage, not on a speciﬁc
source of it.
To summarize, men have a statistically higher score when they face a female
candidate. A man facing a woman gets about a one and a half percentage points
boost in his score compared to a case where he faces a man. Although this advantage
may seem small in magnitude, it has huge implications for the candidates probability
of winning. Using speciﬁcation (6) we compute the probability of winning for a new
male candidate who runs against a female to be 22 percentage points higher than
against a male (this is computed setting all other regressors at their sample mean
values). Similar computations using speciﬁcation (8) reveal that the equivalent gain
for incumbent males is 10 percentage points.
We will now argue that the male advantage just displayed illustrates the existence
of some voters’ bias rather than a party bias. Indeed, a party bias would take the
form of a correlation between gender and the expected score of candidates: men
w o u l db es e n tt od i s t r i c t sw h e r et h el a s ts c o r ei sh i g h e r . T h er e g r e s s i o n si n d i c a t e
that even controlling for observables (the 1997 scores, age diﬀerences, and party
position), there exists a male bias on the voters part. Nonetheless, we will further
directly show that women were not victim of a party bias. In Figure 1, we divide
the range of 1997 scores into intervals of 2.5% and present the ratio of new men
candidates in districts falling in each interval. It turns out that women are sent
to districts where the average 1997 score is equal to 44.72% while men average is
45.57%. Both a t-test (p-value = 0.30) and a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test (p-value
= 0.16) cannot reject that the two are equal.
It is useful to distinguish party bias intended as a pure male conspiracy within
parties against women candidates from a rational party behavior that takes into
account the existence of a male bias in the voters’ population. We can now discuss
the evidence about both party bias and party strategic behavior.19 What we mean
19Note that although we argue that the driving force behind the passing of the parity law and its









































Figure 1: Ratio of Men Candidates
21by parties behaving strategically is that they could send women to sure losers, or
sure winners and men to the tight races. In the sure losers and winners, sending a
woman has little impact on the probability of winning, but in the tight races, sending
a man greatly improves the odds. Using the estimates from speciﬁcation (6), we ﬁnd
the 1997 score that implies a 50-50 chance of winning (setting all other regressors
to their sample mean values). That number is 51%. For 1997 scores below 51%,
women were sent to districts with 1997 scores of 43% while men’s districts averaged
44%. For 1997 scores above 51%, women were assigned districts which averaged 57%
while men’s districts averaged 56%. Although these numbers are in the direction
suggested by parties behaving strategically in the face of a male bias in voting, none
of these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level using either a t-test
or Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test.
However, between 1997 and 2002 things might have changed a lot and parties
may have information about districts which we do not have, and thus it may be that
the bad districts for a given party in 2002 were diﬀerent from the bad ones in 1997.
To address this possibility we again use estimates from speciﬁcation (6) to construct
counterfactual probabilities of winning if parties always presented a candidate of
the same gender as the incumbent in every district. This way, we can infer which
were the close districts in 2002. We will refer to this counterfactual probability
as the “same sex 2002 probability.” Table 5 available in the appendix summarizes
the results of multiple tests to establish the presence of either party bias or party
strategy using both the 1997 and 2002 measures. To test for strategic behavior we
deﬁne a closeness variable for each year, which is 0.51 − |score in 1997 − 0.51| for
the 1997 measure and 0.5−|same sex 2002 probability − 0.5| for 2002. Every test is
performed separately for each party as well as jointly. Beside the t-tests, logits are
also performed controlling for age, age squared as well as party when the two are
combined (the dependent variable is the gender dummy). One set of logits is done
separately with score or closeness, whereas the ﬁnal set includes both regressors in
t h es a m es p e c i ﬁcations (if score is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, that would be
evidence of party bias, if closeness is, that would be evidence of strategic behavior).
An M means that the point (coeﬃcient) estimates suggest a male bias or a party
not inconsistent with our story.
22strategy exploiting a male bias in voting, and F is the same but for females. Overall,
there is almost no statistical signiﬁcance of either (out of the 36 tests reported, only
7 are statistically signiﬁcant). Strategy is statistically signiﬁcant more often than
party bias. Finally, when both are included, none is ever statistically signiﬁcant and
the party bias is reversed in favor of women in two cases. We conclude from this
that there is little to no evidence of party bias or of strategic behavior, but that if
they are present, strategic behavior is slightly more likely.
Another way parties could treat woman diﬀerently is by giving them less funding
for the campaign. There doesn’t seem to be any evidence of this. In fact, one party
gave on average more to its female candidates. There is, however, a big diﬀerence
across parties. The UMP gave 10000 Euros to many of its candidate (the median of
what it gave is 10000) while the PS gave nothing to a majority of them (its median
is 0). The UMP gave on average 9539.424 to its female and 9371.369 to its male
candidates. The PS gave 1446.088 and 1673.339 to its female and male candidates
respectively. For neither party are these numbers statistically diﬀerent (using either
a t-test or a Wilcoxon/Mann-Withney test).
Hence, it seems that females were not assigned to districts that were either more
diﬃcult to win or easier to win than man were. They also did not receive less
ﬁnancial support from their parties. However, there is evidence that controlling for
observables, voters preferred men to women in the 2002 election.
3 Proportional representation
Let us now describe the rules of the senatorial elections. These rules changed slightly
in 2003. The senator oﬃce term was nine years and went down to six years, and a
fraction of the Senate is recomposed every three years. The country is divided in
a few large districts, and, depending on the population of the district, a number of
senators, ranging from 1 to 12, are elected in each district. If the number of seats
to be allocated is equal or below a threshold, then a two-round plurality system is
in order and parity does not apply. If the number is above the threshold, then the
system is CPR. In this case, parity means that in a party list there cannot be two
consecutive candidates of the same gender. The threshold was equal to two in 2001
and to three in 2004.
23An essential feature of the senatorial elections is that the set of voters is composed
of grands electeurs only, and about 95% of them are municipality deputies. They
had no say in the passing of the parity law, but they tried to inﬂuence it through
their senators.
Municipal elections are two round list elections. A list can run in the second
round if it obtains 10% or more in the ﬁrst round. The seat allocation rule is
proportional with a 50% seat bonus to the winner. For instance, if a party wins the
second round elections with 40% of the votes and 60 seats are to be allocated, then
it will get 30+(0.40*30)=42 seats and the remaining 18 seats are allocated among
the other parties proportionally to their second round score. The implementation of
the Parity law at the municipal level has this property: out of each set of subsequent
six candidates in a party list, three have to be women. The only freedom which is
left to the parties is the position of the women within each set of six candidates.
Given the electoral rule and the amounts of seats allocated in each municipality
(varying between 29 and 67), parity cannot but have a huge eﬀect on the gender
composition of the municipal assemblies, and a lot of incumbents must loose their
seat. A fraction of them must even be thrown out of the list. Under the pressure
of their grands electeurs, Senators obtained the amendment that parity would not
apply in municipalities with less than 3500 inhabitants, whereas Assembly deputies
ﬁrst proposed it to apply to all municipalities with more than 2000 inhabitants.
Senators also proposed to remove the three women out of six candidate rule, but it
was maintained. The percentage of women elected in the more than 3500 inhabitants
municipalities went up from 25,7% to 47.5% (thereby making the fraction of women
elected in municipal councils rise from 21,7% to 33%).
Protecting their electorate was not the only concern of the senators: They also
had to protect their own seats.20 Out of the 74 (resp., 72) incumbent senators
looking for reelection in 2001 (resp., 2004) in districts where CPR applies, only 5
(resp., 8) were women. Before the law was passed, senators tried to obtain the
amendment that no alternating gender rule apply for the senatorial elections, but
20The simple computations contained in this section use the electoral outcomes presented on the
website of the French senate, http://www.senat.fr/. The details of the computation is available
upon request.
24failed.21 Nevertheless, only 20 seats - 28% - (resp., 26 - 32.9% -) went to female
candidates. Given the number of districts where parity does not apply and the low
eﬀectiveness where it applies, the percentage of women in the current assembly is
16.6%.
What did senators resort to, in order to circumvent the law? This is illustrated
by the Meurthe-et-Moselle district, where 4 seats had to be allocated. Two right-
wing incumbents had been elected under the same party ﬂag nine years before.22
They split the list, created two new parties, ran on the top of their respective list
(followed, as required by the law, by a woman) and got reelected. Let us call that
strategy party proliferation. Out of the 29 districts where proportional elections
were held in 2001 or 2004, party proliferation (in the sense of incumbents previously
elected under the same ﬂag and running on diﬀerent ones) took place in 11 of
them.23 In 8 other cases candidates elected on diﬀerent lists registered as members
of the same senatorial group after the election.24 Finally, in several other districts,
candidates previously active in the same party, though new in the senatorial race, ran
on diﬀerent lists, with two examples of such lists obtaining more than 10 percent.
Party proliferation has clearly been a wide phenomenon in both elections, which
explains the low eﬀectiveness of parity.
Let us now analyze more closely the phenomenon of strategic party proliferation
in CPR. We ﬁrst describe the conditions under which party proliferation is most
likely to happen. Then we study its eﬀect on the party composition of the assembly.
21Senators have a weaker role in France relative to many other countries. “The Senate’s legislative
powers are limited; the National Assembly has the last word in the event of a disagreement between
the two houses.” (US Department of State (2004)) This is clearly visible in Title V Article 45 of the
Constitution “If the joint committee does not succeed in adopting a common text, or if the text is
not adopted as provided in the preceding paragraph, the Government may, after a further reading
by the National Assembly and by the Senate, ask the National Assembly to make a ﬁnal decision.”
22The 2001 senatorial elections were also the ﬁrst ones where CPR applies. In 1992, candidates
ran on an individual basis (the system was a two-round plurality system) but under a party ﬂag,
and elected senators formed groups according to their party aﬃliation after the elections.
23In 8 out of those cases, one of the candidates lost his seat. In one case both candidates lost
their seats.
24Although, by deﬁnition, those examples involve new candidates to the senatorial elections, these
candidates do typically have incumbent-type advantages, as they are former ministers, deputies,
region presidents, etc.
253.1 Party proliferation
The cost of creating a party is relatively low for the senators. Given the grands
electeurs system and the size of the districts, the actual number of votes needed to
obtain a seat varies between 260 and 892. Moreover, those are councillors themselves
and senators have regular opportunities to meet them. Let us consider a party
likely to obtain a score of s and an associated number of k seats, with k male
incumbents. Let k be an even number. It seems reasonable to assume that the
incumbent’s advantage is decreasing among candidates from the leader of the list to
the kth elected: popularity decreases with rank. Given parity, only k
2 incumbents
can be given positions among the ﬁrst k positions, those leading to a seat with




th incumbent is pivotal in the proliferation
process. His only chance of being elected is in creating his own list and diverting
at least s
k+1 voters from the main party. This score is necessary, as the score of the
main party, down to ks
k+1, is otherwise still superior to k times that of the dissident
list. This may not be suﬃcient, however, since other parties may have a larger
d’Hondt score for the last seat and obtain the formerly kth seat of that party. To
illustrate this fact, let us consider a district where three parties compete for 8 seats
and the distribution of scores is (45,27.5,27.5), so that the allocation of seats is
(4,2,2). After the parity reform, incumbent 3 of the ﬁrst party is ejected from the
ﬁrst positions on the list. By running on his own and obtaining 10 percent of the
votes, which corresponds to scores (35,10,27.5,27.5), he would keep his seat. If we
compare that result with the situation where there is only one opponent party and
the scores are (45,55) before parity and (35,10,55) after proliferation by incumbent
3, we now have a distribution of seats going from (4,4) to (3,0,5). The lower bound
in the second situation is now 11 and the scores (33.9,11.1,55) then lead to (3,1,4).
Let us also note that any two incumbents ejected from the main party list have no
incentive to create a joint list, as, given parity, their joint list would have to win
three seats for them both to be elected.




th incumbent is sure to keep his seat if he creates
his own list. Then the probability that the k
2th incumbent be elected on the main
list decreases, as the new score of the main party may no longer be suﬃcient to




th incumbent is able to be elected
26by running on his own, then so is the k
2th incumbent, given the assumption that
individual popularity decreases with the rank. The prudent strategy by candidate
k





th incumbent to be elected.
From this simple argument we can infer that proliferation is the more likely




th incumbent, but the unravelling may determine a
situation in which the incumbents who actually are observed making the split are
higher in the rank. If k i sl a r g e ,i tm a yb ei m p o s s i b l et oh a v eas u ﬃciently large
popularity for the (k/2+1)-th incumbent and, at the same time, a decreasing order
of popularity. This leads to the following:
Remark: Party proliferation is more likely when (1) the incumbency advantage
is more equal among candidates and (2) the number of incumbents on the list,
and/or the number of seats expected by a list, is lower.
The example and the reasoning above all assume that the scores are perfectly
expected. Proliferation is also more likely when the uncertainty of being elected
by running on one’s own is lower. When the number of seats to be allocated in a
district and the number of relevant parties are larger, then the competition for the
last seats to allocate is larger, which increases the uncertainty.
This explains why, given that districts have on average a relatively small number
of seats, parity had low eﬀect in the senatorial elections.
3.2 Assembly composition eﬀect
Parity may also aﬀect the assembly composition under CPR. There are two diﬀerent
eﬀects. One is the large party eﬀect, playing in a similar way as under SMD: if a
party has more incumbents than half the total number of seats, then it has to loose
the votes associated with the incumbency advantage of the incumbents it ejects from
the list. Clearly, this may aﬀect the score of the party, and, therefore, the number
of seats it gets.
The second eﬀect is directly associated to party proliferation. In the example
above, proliferation by incumbent 3 led to a change in the assembly composition
from (4,4) to (3,0,5) which means a shift of one seat from left to right. The example
may look extreme, as the proliferation was a failure. However, other examples may
27be given of successful proliferation aﬀecting the assembly composition. Consider a
district where two parties compete for 6 seats. The expected scores are (43,57),
which would lead to a (3,3) allocation of seats. Assume that, indeed, there are
three incumbents out of each platform. Again, we may think that incumbent 3 of
the left party can proﬁtably create his own list, thereby preventing incumbent 2
from keeping his own seat. The equilibrium list composition is therefore one where
the left party has split into two lists, led by incumbents 1 and 2 respectively. Let
us assume that the resulting distribution of votes is (24,19,57), the resulting seat
allocation is (1,1,4): proliferation by left incumbent 2 is successful, but increases the
number of seats obtained by the right party.
The composition eﬀect arising from the conﬂicting interests of an incumbent
seeking to keep his seat and a party seeking to maximize the number of seats obtained
by candidates sharing its platform is likely to aﬀect both large and small parties. It
is well known that under the d’Hondt system a party can never gain by splitting,
as the d’Hondt coeﬃcients cannot rise as a result of a split. As a consequence, the
platform which looses is always the one where proliferation takes place. As it is
clear from the example, proliferation is more likely to result in a loss of seats when
the d’Hondt coeﬃcient of the party as a whole is the lowest among all parties.
4 Remarks on electoral design
The common criterion used to evaluate election reforms such as the parity law in
France is the eﬀectiveness of the reform: did it help increase the percentage of women
elected? Another important criterion, however, is the desirability of the increase in
the number of women elected. In this section, we point out how electoral systems
could be reformed, ﬁrst if the objective is to increase the number of women only if
the voters want it, and second if the objective is to increase the number of women
even if the voters do not want it.25
25It has been well documented that the percentage of elected women is larger in countries having
PR systems (see e.g. Matland [9]). However, such international observational comparisons do
not elaborate on the causality and they cannot be used for normative purposes. They ignore the
possibility that gender bias can be the primary factor as well as the fact that party proliferation
can make eﬀectiveness low under CPR without thresholds.
28If an increase in the number of elected women is seen desirable only when the
voters want it, then quotas do not, a priori, make much sense. But as we saw above,
parity in the candidacy did not prevent the voters from expressing their gender bias
at the national Assembly elections. They did not want the number of women to
increase, and indeed it did not. That is, introducing quotas in a SMD system is
perfectly consistent with this criterion as quotas will only be eﬀective if there is, on
average, a rationed demand for elected women among voters.
Introducing quotas into an electoral system diﬀerent from SMD could, on the
contrary, be eﬀective independently of the demand for female candidates, as exam-
pliﬁed by the municipal elections in France. But there comes the second criterion.
Arguments can be drawn from the debates on positive action to defend the view
that the number of female candidates should increase even if the voters do not want
it, as, in the long run, it will increase the competence of women candidates, or it
will improve voters’ perception of the quality of female candidates (in the terms of
this paper, it will decrease the male bias), or it will increase the ability of voters to
discriminate between good and bad female politicians, etc. In this case, a reform is
useless under a SMD system.
Introducing quotas into a PR system may be eﬀective, provided there are barriers
to party proliferation. The easiest way to create barriers is by enlarging the districts
and, correspondingly, the number of seats to allocate in the districts. First, this
reduces the expected incumbent’s advantage of the pivotal incumbent. Second, as
the number of competing parties is larger in larger districts, the competition for the
last seats to allocate is larger, thereby increasing the sensitivity of the total number
of seats obtained by a platform to the way the total number of votes is divided
between the lists obtained by proliferation from one party.
A second change in the proportional system which would enhance eﬀectiveness
of the parity law is the introduction of legal thresholds. First, such thresholds would
make successful proliferation more diﬃcult, as the minimal percentage to obtain one
seat is increased. Second, even if lists proliferate as a consequence of self-interested
behavior by incumbents, if the threshold is put suﬃciently high so that once a party
obtains seats, the number of seats is at least equal to 2, then the number of women
elected cannot but rise.26
26Term limits are another institution that on the one hand would increase eﬀectiveness of a parity
29Introducing quotas into a mixed system like the French municipal system is very
eﬀective but advocating for a shift towards that system involves forgetting about
its important drawback of allowing even small parties to obtain the majority of the
seats (in the extreme case, a party with a little bit more than 10% of the votes in
the ﬁrst round can end up obtaining 100% of the seats).27
5 Comparative remarks and future research
Gender quotas in elections exist in many other countries, in various forms, but
France was the ﬁrst country where (1) quotas were imposed on parties at the list
composition stage, rather than directly to the distribution of seats, and where (2)
diﬀerent elective bodies are elected with diﬀerent electoral formulas. Legal quotas
on candidates (without fees) were ﬁrst introduced in Belgium in 1994 but at the
level of 25% (this ﬁgure increased to 33.3% from 1999 onwards).28 Legal quotas
on seats exist, for instance, in India (see Duﬂo and Chattopadhyay [6]) and quotas
on candidates based on voluntary commitments by parties exist, for instance, in
N o r w a ya n dS w e d e n( s e ee . g .D a h l e r u p[ 4 ]f o rac o m p r e h e n s i v el i s to fa l lt h eq u o t a
systems). In future research we plan to analyze in detail the comparative history
and genesis of gender quotas across countries. Here we just note that our empirical
results on male bias are in contrast with the results on American voters.
First of all, the parity law can have bite only in countries where parties are very
powerful in determining the set of candidates. Countries with a closed list electoral
system and strong parties are more likely than countries like the U.S. to consider
such laws. Beside this institutional observation, the precondition for the politicians’
incentive to pass a parity law is missing, according to our analysis above, when
male bias does not exist. In chapter 3 of Darcy, Welch and Clark’s [3] survey work,
they found that new men candidates did as well as new women candidates for State
legislatures (table 3.3). So the fact that the total percentage of women in state
legislatures is still 20 percent is mostly due to the power of incumbents and to lack
law but, on the other hand, would make it less likely that the incumbents would pass a parity law.
27The sense in which this is a drawback refers to standard ex-ante welfare criteria. See for example
Morelli [10] for a suggestive welfare comparison of electoral systems along similar criteria.
28The eﬀectiveness has been higher in Belgium, because the electoral system is open list PR with
minimum legal thresholds.
30of supply. Voters’ hostility to women is considered disappeared by the 70’s. They
also point out (table 3.4) that no voters’ hostility exists in primaries. The evidence
against slating and the evidence against the hypothesis of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
fund raising should be also considered evidence against the male conspiracy theory
(Duverger [7]), which is the basis for the party bias hypothesis. In table 3.5 they
show evidence that men are put in more uphill battles, and they consider it evidence
of no-slating. In table 3.6 they show that there is a pattern of more women of party
x running in states dominated by party y, but within the states the women are
placed in good districts, hence again no evidence of slating. Finally in 3.7 they show
that if anything women seem to be better at fund-raising.
In summary, they conclude, in our terms, that in the US states there seems to
be no evidence of voters’ hostility against women, nor any evidence in favor of the
male conspiracy theory. So no “demand side” explanation for low number of women
in politics. Implicitly this implies a mostly “supply side” story for the U.S.29 Their
conclusion was basically that “in the U.S. if more women run more women will be
elected.”
This sharp contrast between our study on the French case and the earlier studies
on the U.S.30 suggests an intriguing hypothesis to be tested in future research:
Countries where voters’ gender bias exists have fewer women than men because of a
“demand” bias, and are more likely to endogenously generate aﬃrmative action laws;
on the other hand, countries like the U.S. where no voters’ demand bias exists, and
where therefore the shortage of women in politics is a “supply” issue, are unlikely
to have the necessary conditions for the approval of a parity law.
As part of our future research on endogenous aﬃrmative action or, more gen-
erally, on endogenous institutional reform due to incumbents’ interests, we plan to
extend the theoretical as well as the empirical analysis to campaign ﬁnancing: there
is a great variation of campaign ﬁnancing and party funding laws across democra-
29Even at the congressional level no evidence can be convincingly put forward about voters’
hostility (See in particular Welch et al. [12] and Darcy and Schramm [2]). About the existence of
party bias, some evidence can be found in the U.S. State legislatures if one uses measures of party
strength: in States were parties are stronger there tend to be less women (see Sanbonmatsu [11]).
30Note that our empirical analysis is based on ﬁeld data, whereas the studies just mentioned on
the U.S. are based on survey data, and we have no way to say to what extent these sharp diﬀerences
could be due to this.
31cies, and we conjecture that campaign ﬁnancing restrictions, as much as the gender
quotas studied in this paper, may well be motivated by the same objectives of in-
cumbent politicians. Moreover, the politicians of countries with diﬀerent electoral
systems are likely to value diﬀerent kinds of “institutional complementarities” with
campaign ﬁnancing laws, and it is our goal to continue to uncover these diﬀerent
types of institutional complementarities.
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34A p p e n d i x1 :P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1
Once z is known, the country is conceptually divided into three regions: [0,min{z,λ});
[min{z,λ},max{z,λ}];a n d[max{z,λ},1]. Parties L and S play a list composi-
t i o ng a m e ,a n das t r a t e g yi sa na s s i g n m e n to fam a no raw o m a ni ne a c hd i s -
trict. Formally, a strategy is an element of {0,1}[0,1] where 0 (resp. 1) means
that a woman (respectively, a man) is sent to that district. Denote by m
j
p ∈ [0,1]
the fraction of men candidates running for party p, p ∈ {L,S},i nr e g i o nj, j ∈
{[0,min{z,λ}),[min{z,λ},max{z,λ}),[max{z,λ},1]}.
G i v e no u ra s s u m p t i o n so nv o t e r s ’p l a t f o rm preferences and gender preferences,
each party wants to send men where the other party sends men if the platform
preference of the voters is favorable, or send men where the opponent sends women
if the opposite is true. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In any Nash equilibrium of the list composition game played at time 1
by the two parties, each party uses the same mixed strategy in every district of the




Proof. Suppose instead that party S puts a man running in district i with
probability mS(i) <m S(i0),w h e r ei and i0 are in the same region j.
Then if j is a region in which L wins the man-man races the best response is to
have mL(i0) >m L(i); but this could not be compatible in equilibrium with the
hypothesis, since the best response to the latter inequality for party S must have
the feature mS(i) >m S(i0).
A similar contradiction arises if j is a region in which S wins the man-to-man races:
In this case the best response by L would have to satisfy mL(i) >m L(i0), but this
in turn cannot be compatible in equilibrium with the hypothesis, since the best
response to the latter inequality by party S would be mS(i) >m S(i0). QED.
The list composition game is, therefore, equivalent to a game where parties
have to decide on proportions of men in each of the three regions. Suppose for
example that z<λ(the voters’ support of the L platform has decreased since the
last election). Then parties have to decide on m0z
p ,m zλ
p ,m λ1










of L candidates are elected in region [0,z), as all






those who end up running against a woman also win the election, and the probability






Having explained the strategies for any probability distribution over z,l e tu s
now choose a speciﬁc probability distribution that will allow us to prove the result.
Assume that z can take values in {0,1 − λ,λ,1}, with corresponding probabilities
equal to 0.5−f,f,f,0.5−f,f o rs o m ef ∈ (0.25,0.5).( T h u sf measures the skewness
of the distribution.)
Assume that s is inﬁnitesimally small, so that it justiﬁes a seat maximizing
behavior ceteris paribus but it can be ignored in the computations. Given this




Uidi = λ + aIL − CL if NL > 0.5
0.5λ + aIL − CL if NL =0 .5





Uidi =( 1 − λ)+aIS − CS if NS > 0.5
0.5(1 − λ)+aIS − CS if NS =0 .5
aIS − CS if NS < 0.5.
Consider ﬁrst the status quo (c =0 ). At time 1, it is a dominant strategy for
both parties to have only male candidates. the expected utility is then:
∀i ∈ [0,1 − λ): Ue
i = af +( 1+a)f +( 0 .5 − f)(1 + a)
=( 0 .5+f)a +0 .5;
∀i ∈ [1 − λ,λ): Ue
i =( 1+a)f +( 0 .5 − f)(1 + a)
=0 .5(1 + a);
∀i ∈ [λ,1] : Ue
i =( 0 .5+f)a +0 .5.
Consider next the pure parity case (c = ∞). We ﬁrst analyse the equilibrium
of the list composition subgames in the four possible cases, and then we deduce the
expected utility of each incumbent.
36Case 1: z =0 ;the 0.5 men candidates sent by S will be elected, and necessarily
at least some women will be elected too, so that S will win the election. It is optimal
for S to have all its incumbents running. Therefore, in region [0,λ],,b yl e m m a1 ,




λ in every district of that
region. Consequently, each L incumbent has a probability 0.5
λ of running, and, if he
runs, a probability 0.5
λ of being elected. All S incumbents are sure to be reelected.
Case 2: z =1 − λ. Sending all its 0.5 men to districts in [1 − λ,1] guar-
antees 0.5 seats, and S is sure to have more than that, so, again, S is sure to
win the election. The equilibrium strategies are m0z





S =0 ,m zλ
S = 1
2,m λ1
S =1 . Incumbents in [0,z) and [λ,1] are sure to be reelected,
whereas incumbents in [z,λ) r u nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1
2 and, if they run, are elected
with probability 1
2.
Cases 3 and 4: z = λ or z =1 . L wins the election. In this case party L
tries to send men where S sends men, and S tries to send men where L sends







Incumbents from region [0,λ) r u nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y0.5
λ and are sure to be reelected
if they run.
The expected utilities computed at time 0 are as follows.
∀i ∈ [0,1 − λ): Ue
i =( 0 .5 − f)
0.52










λ2 (λ +0 .5 − f)+f
¶
a +0 .5;
∀i ∈ [1 − λ,λ): Ue
i =( 0 .5 − f)
0.52

















∀i ∈ [λ,1] : Ue
i =0 .5(1+a)+0 .5a
= a +0 .5.
It is easy to see that S incumbents strictly prefer pure parity to no parity, as it
guarantees their reelection.
Let us now consider the case of parity with fees (c = c∗ ∈ (0,∞)). Take in
particular any value of c∗ such that
Assumption a: a/2 >c ∗ >s≈ 0.
37Case 1: z =0 . At equilibrium, S must win the election. Indeed, it has at
least 0.5 seats (all its men are elected), and, if it is not suﬃcient to win, then it is
worth paying the fee for one male candidate. So we can consider that S wins the
election with 0.5 men running. S tries to maximize the number of seats obtained,
so that the equilibrium will be mixed, with MS (the number of men running for
Sin [0,λ))e q u a lt oλ − 0.5. The utility of party L is UL = a0.5
λ ML − c∗ (ML − 0.5)
where ML stands for the number of men running in [0,λ). Rearranging, we get
UL =
¡0.5
λ a − c∗¢
ML+0.5c∗, so that L pays the fees for all its incumbents whenever
0.5
λ a − c∗ > 0, that is, a>2c∗λ, which holds given assumption a. Therefore, all the




λ , whereas the utility of each S incumbent is 1+a.
Case 2: z =1− λ.A s a b o v e , S is sure to win, provided all men run in [z,1].
It has no incentive to take a man from [λ,1] to [z,λ), given that c∗ >s ,nor to
[0,z), as the probability for a man to be elected in that region is 0. If a man from
party L runs in [z,λ], then his probability of being elected is 0.5. Utility of party L
is UL =( 1− λ)a +0 .5(ML − (λ − 0.5))a − c∗(ML − 0.5).S op a r t yL will pay the
fees, given assumption a. For each incumbent in [0,1 − λ), Ui = a − c∗
λ (λ − 0.5),
and the average utility of those from [1 − λ,λ) is 0.5a − c∗
λ (λ − 0.5). The utility of
incumbents of S is 1+a.
Case 3: z = λ. For a similar reason as above, L is sure to win. Party S sends
all its incumbents, and sends men uniformly in [0,λ). We have UL =1+aML −
c∗(ML − 0.5), so that ML = λ, all to be reelected. The utility of each L incumbent
is 1+a − c∗
λ (λ − 0.5), and that of S incumbents is a.
Case 4: z =1 .T h e f a c t t h a t L men are sure to be elected even if they run
in [λ,1] does not change the strategy from the previous case, as paying the fee for
having one more male candidate elected is not proﬁtable if he is not an incumbent.
The equilibrium utilities are, therefore, identical to what they are in case 3.
The expected utility of the incumbents can be computed as follows (letting C∗
38stand for c∗
λ (λ − 0.5)):
∀i ∈ [0,1 − λ): Ue












+ f +0 .5
¶
a +0 .5 − C∗;
∀i ∈ [1 − λ,λ): Ue












+0 .5f +0 .5
¶
a +0 .5 − C∗;
∀i ∈ [λ,1] : Ue
i =0 .5(1+a)+0 .5a
= a +0 .5.
At time 0:
Let us now compare the expected utility of each incumbent across the diﬀerent
possible values of c.
1) For incumbents in [0,1 − λ):it is clear that parity with fees is the system
which maximizes their probability of being reelected. But the other consequence is
that fees have to be paid. We have that parity with fees is better than no parity
iﬀ a ≥ 2c∗ λ−0.5
0.5−f, which can only be satisﬁed if 0.5 − f is not too small. Let us note
that a very low 0.5−f means that those incumbents are almost sure to be reelected
even without parity, so that it is intuitive that no parity is the best system for them.
Given our assumptions, it is suﬃcient to have 0.5−f>λ −0.5, which is reasonable,
in order to have the incumbents in this region strictly prefer parity with fees to no
parity. Strict parity is better than no parity iﬀ 0.5 − f>2λ(λ − 0.5), which again
means that the probability to be in a bad state is suﬃciently large; but observe
that the threshold is more diﬃcult to satisfy than in the previous case (it is more
likely to have parity with fees better than no parity than strict parity better than no
parity). Parity with fees is better than pure parity iﬀ a ≥
2λc∗(λ−0.5)
λ(λ−f)−0.5(0.5−f), which
is satisﬁed if the condition above for parity with fees to dominate no parity holds.
Thus, parity with fees is the best for those incumbents if 0.5−f is suﬃciently large.
2) For incumbents in [1−λ,λ):parity with fees is preferred to no parity iﬀ a>
2c∗ λ−0.5
0.5−(1−λ)f. B u tw eh a v ea l r e a d ya s s u m e dt h a ta>2c∗, and the fraction is always
lower than 1. Parity with fees is preferred to strict parity iﬀ a>2c∗ λ(λ−0.5)
(1−λ)f+λ2+0.52,
and again the fraction is always smaller than 1. Consequently, parity with fees is
39always the strictly most preferred solution in this region.
3) The incumbents in [λ,1] all strictly prefer a parity law, with whatever c>0,
to the status quo.
Consequently, given assumption a, there are many probability distributions with
many possible skewness levels such that parity with fees is strictly preferred by the
majority (the L incumbents) to any other system. Given the strict preference by
the S incumbents for any type of parity law over the status quo, the parity with




(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
Own Party Score in 1997 0.541*** 0.612*** 0.497*** 0.504***
(0.053) (0.049) (0.044) (0.044)
Male candidate with Female Opponent 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.011** 0.012**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Female candidate with Male Opponent -0.007 -0.010 -0.017** -0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Female candidate with Female Opponent -0.011 -0.007 0.012 0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Age Diﬀerence /100 0.445** 0.486*** 0.075 0.114
(0.179) (0.181) (0.164) (0.163)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Party Right of Center 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Opponent is a New Candidate 0.013
(0.011)
Opponent is a 1997 Loser 0.037*** -0.007
(0.012) (0.005)
Opponent was Moved 0.001 -0.026
(0.013) (0.029)
Constant 0.172*** 0.146*** 0.239*** 0.232***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Observations 248 248 290 290
F-Test of Symmetry Hypothesis (p-values) 0.121 0.193 0.454 0.392
Standard errors in parentheses
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 3: The Eﬀect of Male Bias on Scores
42Candidate: New Incumbent
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c)
Own Party Score in 1997 0.543*** 0.609*** 0.504*** 0.513***
(0.054) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043)
Male Advantage 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.012** 0.012***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age Diﬀerence /100 0.433** 0.481** 0.129 0.162
(0.198) (0.200) (0.188) (0.187)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age /100 -0.005** -0.005** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age Diﬀerence x Male Advantage /100 0.049 0.074 -0.166 -0.137
(0.295) (0.297) (0.270) (0.270)
Diﬀerence of Square of Age x Male Advantage /100 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Party Right of Center 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.082***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Opponent is a New Candidate 0.014
(0.010)
Opponent is a 1997 Loser 0.034*** -0.008
(0.012) (0.005)
Opponent was Moved From Another District 0.001 -0.029
(0.013) (0.029)
Constant 0.173*** 0.150*** 0.235*** 0.227***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 248 248 290 290
Standard errors in parentheses
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 4: The Eﬀect of Male Bias on Scores
43Party Bias Strategy using a voting
in favor of bias in favor of
1997 2002 1997 2002
PS M* M M* M
t-test UMP M M M M
Overall M M* M M*
Logit with party PS M M M* M
bias or strategy, UMP M M M M
age, age2 (, party) Overall M* M M* M
Logit with: party PS M F M M
bias and strategy, UMP F M M M
age, age2 (, party) Overall M M M M
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
M stands for male and F for female.
Table 5: Party Bias or Strategy?
44